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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
)

CASE NO.

20000589-CA

MARK ANTHONY MERLEN,
PRIORITY NO. 2
Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2) (e) (1999) .
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions
are relevant to this case, and their text is set forth in Addendum
A: Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1;

Did the district court err in denying Merlen's

motion to suppress, where the police officer detained Merlen
without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The factual findings underlying a trial
court's denial of a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous

standard.

(Utah.Ct.App. 1996).

State

v.

Patefield,

The trial court's

reviewed for correctness. Id.

2

927

P.2d

655,

657

legal conclusions are

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 22, 2000, Mark Anthony Merlen was charged by
information with one count of Unlawful Possession or Use of a
Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2); one count of Unlawful Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2); one count of Possession of
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37a-5. Merlen moved to suppress all of the evidence
which was obtained during his detention and arrest based on Fourth
Amendment

violations

which

occurred

during

Merlenfs

initial

detention. On May 26, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was held on
Merlen's motion. At the end of the hearing, Judge Halliday denied
Merlen's motion to suppress.
guilty plea to Amended Count

On June 2, 2000, Merlen entered a
I of the Information, Unlawful

Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2), and reserved his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On that same
day, he was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
On December 25, 1999, Price City Officer Tracy Allred was on
routine patrol. (R. 51 at 8:18:22). Shortly after midnight, Officer
Allred was patrolling the area around the north ballpark and the

3

horse corrals. (R. 51 at 9:3-6). In that particular area, there had
been incidents of criminal mischief and teenagers smoking marijuana
and drinking beer. (R. 51 at 9:6-8).
As Officer Allred came to the north end of the road toward the
ballpark complex, he noticed a truck in the main parking lot on the
east side of the complex. (R. 51 at 9:14-16).

Officer Allred drove

past without stopping, and went around to check the west end of the
complex.

(R. 51 at 9:16:17). As Officer Allred was coming back

past the east end, he noticed that the truck was still there. (R.
51 at 9:17-18).

There was no other traffic in the area at that

time. (R. 51 at 9:19-24).
Officer Allred initially testified that he became suspicious
of the truck because of his past experience with juveniles drinking
and smoking marijuana in that area, and also because of that fact
that suicides often occur during the holiday season. (R. 51 at
10:2-10). Later, the officer conceded that he never asked Merlen
any questions, or made any inquiry, regarding Merlen's mental or
emotional state. (R. 51 at 20:1-4).
Officer Allred testified that he approached the truck in his
vehicle, and stopped in front of the truck, so that his patrol car
was facing the front of the truck at about a 45 degree angle.
51 at 10:1-14).

(R.

Officer Allred testified that his patrol car did

not block the truck in, and that it would have been possible for
the truck to drive away. (R. 51 at 10:15-18).

But he conceded the

rear end of Merlen's truck was up against a curb or hill, and that
4

he parked in front of the truck so that the right front of the
patrol car was at the right front of Merlen' s truck. (R. 51 at
20:16-20).
Officer Allred testified that he noticed that the truck had
California license plates, and realized that he had seen the same
truck a few days earlier. (R. 51 at 10:20-23).

Officer Allred

remembered from seeing the truck earlier that the registration on
the truck had expired in 1997. (R. 51 at 10:20-23).

Officer Allred

testified that as he sat in his patrol car, he called into dispatch
with a description of the truck and the

license plate number.

(R.

51 at 10:25, 11:1-2).
As Officer Allred was calling the information into dispatch,
he noticed that a male, who turned out to be Mark Merlen, was
sitting in the truck on the passenger side of the vehicle. (R. 51
at 11:1-3) . Officer Allred testified that he could Merlen making
"a lot of movement with his hands as if he was putting something
down in front of his pants or down his pants.
No one else was in the vehicle.

(R. 51 at 11:2-5).

(R. 51 at 11:6-7).

Officer Allred got out of his patrol vehicle and approached
the truck on foot. (R. 51 at 11:15-19).

Officer Allred had the

"take down" lights of his patrol car directed at Merlen's vehicle
as he approached the truck. (R. 51 at 22:1-4).

Officer Allred

walked around the side of the truck, and saw empty beer cartons in
the back of the truck.

(R. 51 at 11:15-19). Officer Allred

initially testified that the window was rolled down before he
5

approached, (R. 51 at 11:20-23), but later conceded that Merlen may
have rolled the window down after the officer approached that side
of the vehicle. (R. 51 at 19:6-15). The officer approached Merlenf s
window and asked him "what was going on." (R. 51 at 11:18-19).
Officer Allred testified that Merlen said that he was just relaxing
there in his truck.

(R. 51 at 12:4-5). Officer Allred asked Merlen

if he'd been drinking, and Merlen said no.

(R. 51 at 12:5-6).

Officer Allred testified that he did not smell alcohol or observe
any sign that Merlen was impaired. (R. 51 at 12:4-9).
After verifying that Merlen had not been drinking and was not
depressed or suicidal, Officer Allred asked Merlen to shut off the
engine of his vehicle. (R. 51 at 12:9-11, 23:20-25, 24:1-8). When
he asked Merlen to turn off his vehicle, Officer Allred could not
identify any particular criminal activity that Merlen had engaged
in or was about to engage in. (R. 51 at 22:16-20). However, Officer
Allred asked Merlen to turn the engine off

because he wanted to

talk to Merlen some more (R. 51 at 12:8-11), and wanted to assure
that Merlen would not drive away. (R. 51 at 22:8-13, 23:14-19).
Merlen complied with the officer's request. (R. 51 at 12:12-13).
After he turned off the engine, the keys remained in the ignition.
(R. 51 at 12:14-15).
Officer Allred asked Merlen why he was moving around as if he
was trying to hide something, and Merlen answered that he was
simply zipping his pants up. (R. 51 at 12:17-19).

Officer Allred

then explained to Merlen that he was talking to him because "it was
6

suspicious for him to be out here in the middle . . . of nowhere at
1:00 in the morning ." (R. 51 at 12:19-22).
Allred asked Merlen for his

At that point, Officer

driver's license.

(R. 51 at 12:20-

23) .
Merlen provided his driver's license, as requested. (R. 51 at
12:24-25). Officer Allred continued talking with Merlen.

Merlen

admitted that the registration was expired, but informed the
officer that he had purchased a temporary registration sticker. (R.
51 at 13:6-8). Officer Allred

testified that he went around the

back of the vehicle to look at the registration sticker, but
couldn't find an expiration date on the temporary sticker, because
it was too faded. (R. 51 at 13:8-10).

Officer Allred testified

that he never went to check the registration until after he had
asked Merlen to turn the truck's engine off. (R. 51 at 22:4-13).
At that point, Officer Allred returned to his patrol car to
run a statewide and local warrants check on Merlen. (R. 51 at
13:15-16).

Before dispatch got back to Officer Allred, Merlen

informed the officer that he had a $500.00 warrant out of Draper.
(R. 13:18-21).

After verifying that Merlen did have a warrant,

Officer Allred told Merlen to step out of the truck.
14:10-13).

(R. 51 at

Officer Allred handcuffed Merlen and placed him the

patrol car. (R. 51 at 14:10-15). During a search subsequent to
Merlen's arrest, a small quantity of controlled substances was
found on Merlen's person. (R. 51 at 15:7-11), ultimately leading to
his conviction in the instant case.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The officer continued to detain Merlen after his initial
suspicions were dispelled, without reasonable suspicion, and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Merlen's arrest warrant was

discovered during the period in which Merlen was unlawfully seized,
and the evidence found during the search subsequent to arrest, and
was therefore fruit of the unlawful seizure and should have

been

suppressed.
ARGUMENT
I•

The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Merlen's Motion to
Suppress Where the Officer Continued to Detain Merlen
After His Initial Suspicions Were Dispelled.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. See e.g. United States v. Stone/ 866 F.2d 359, 362
(10th Cir. 1989). Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,
88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), a law enforcement officer may stop and
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes "if the officer
has a reasonable suspicion . . . that criminal activity may be
afoot." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1,
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).

The reasonableness of an investigative

detention is a dual inquiry: (1) "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception," and (2) whether the officer's action
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that first
justified the interference." United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140,
1141 (10th Cir. 1998)(quotation omitted); see Terry, 392 U.S. at

8

20.

However, "[a]n officer may approach a citizen at any time and

pose questions [without reasonable suspicion or probable cause] as
long as the citizen is not detained against his will.
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881

State v.

(Utah.Ct .App. 1989) (quoting State v.

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)).
In the instant case, as set forth below, the encounter between
Merlen

and the police

officer was not consensual encounter.

Additionally, while there may have been reasonable suspicion to
justify the initial stop, the officer unlawfully exceeded the scope
of

the

stop

when

they

detained

Merlen

after

the

initial

justification had dissipated, without reasonable suspicion for
doing so.
A.

The Initial Stop Was Not a Consensual Encounter

A police-citizen encounter is not consensual if, "in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed he was not free to leave." United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
In the instant case, the encounter between Merlen and Officer
Allred took place very late at night in a very isolated location.
The officer acknowledged that he parked his patrol car in such a
manner that the right front of his car was near the left front of
Merlen's truck. (R. 51 at 20:16-20). In other words the vehicles
were nose-to-nose, but the officer's patrol car was parked at an
angle to Merlen's truck. The officer acknowledged that Merlen's
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truck was backed up against a curb or hill.

(R. 51 at 20:16-20).

The officer activated his "take down" lights before exiting his
patrol car, and approached the window on the passenger side where
Merlen was sitting. (R. 51 at 11:15-19, 22:1-4). After asking a few
questions, the officer asked Merlen to turn off the engine to the
vehicle.

(R. 51 at 22:16-20).

He testified he did so for the

purpose of making sure that Merlen didn't drive away while he was
talking to him.

(R. 51 at 22:16-20).

It is hard to imagine that a reasonable person in Merlen's
position would have felt free to ignore the officer's questions and
drive away.

In fact, the circumstances in this case are nearly

identical to those in State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah.Ct .App.
1997), wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that the stop was not
consensual, and was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
In Struhs, a sheriff's deputy saw the defendant driving
towards a construction site at about 10:00 p.m. Struhs at 1226.
The defendant turned his truck around at the end of the road
leading to the construction site, and backed up against some
barricades and a sign that said "Road Closed." Id. The deputy
parked her vehicle directly in front of the defendant's car, nose
to nose, but about one-and-a-half car lengths in front of the
defendant's car.

Id.

The officer activated her headlights and her

takedown lights, and approached the defendant's vehicle on foot.
Od.

The Struhs court held that a reasonable person would not have

felt free to leave because of the late hour, the isolated location,
10

the activation of the takedown lights, and the parking nose-to-nose
with the defendant's vehicle.1 Id. at 1228. The court rejected the
State's argument that, because the defendant's vehicle was not
completely blocked in by the patrol car, the defendant was not
detained for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id.
In the instant case, along with nearly all of the factors
present in Struhs, there are two additional factors that make it
clear that this was not a consensual encounter.

First, it is clear

from the record that Merlen's car was very nearly blocked in by the
officer's patrol car.

The officer acknowledged that Merlen's truck

was backed right up to the edge of a hill or curb.

(R. 51 at 20:8-

15) . The officer also testified that he parked his patrol car with
"the right front of my car being to the right front of his car."
(R. 51 at 20:16-20).

While the officer testified that Merlen's car

was not completely blocked in (R. 51 at 10:15-18), his path was
clearly blocked to a significant degree, and had he wished to drive
away, he would have had to maneuver his way around the police car
in order to do so.
Additionally, and more importantly, the officer went beyond
activating

the takedown

lights and parking nose-to-nose, and

actually asked Merlen to turn off the engine of his vehicle. The

:

The Struhs court also referred to "the confrontational
approach made by the officer," but did not cite any facts
supporting a confrontation approach except that the deputy had
pulled up to the defendant with no lights on, and then suddenly
activated her high beams and takedown light. Struhs at 1228.
11

officer testified that he did so because he "wanted to talk to
[Merlen] more" and "didn't want him drivin' off." (R. 51 at 22:815) . It is simply inconceivable that any citizen would feel free
to simply drive away with a police officer standing outside your
car window asking you to turn your engine off - and to imply that
it would be lawful to do so is to place both citizens and police
officers in a very vulnerable position during such encounters.
Accordingly, it is clear that Merlen was detained from the
moment the officer approached his car window and began questioning
him.

But assuming for argument's sake that the initial seconds of

the encounter were consensual, the stop was certainly converted to
an investigative detention once the officer asked Merlen to turn
his engine off, which Merlen himself had not done voluntarily.
II.

The Officer Exceeded the Scope of The Lawful Encounter
When He Detained Merlen For Questioning After Dispelling
His Initial Suspicions.

The

officer

exceeded

the lawful

scope of the encounter

(whether it was merely consensual or an investigative detention
supported by reasonable suspicion) when he asked Merlen to shut off
the engine of his vehicle, and thereby converted the encounter into
a seizure which was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
Assuming that there was reasonable suspicion for the officer's
initial encounter with Merlen, "[a]n investigative detention must
*last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.'" United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir.
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1999)

(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d

229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)). It must be temporary, and its scope
must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. United
States v. Gutierrez-Daniez, 131 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1997),
cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1035 (1998); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d
942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997) . Once the initial justification for the
stop is satisfied, the officer must allow the driver to proceed
without further delay or additional questioning. United States v.
Patten, 183 F.3d at 1193; United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059,
1064 (10th Cir. 1997) .
A

longer

detention

for

additional

questioning

"must

be

supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity
. . . based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality
of the circumstances." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah
Ct.App. 1998). See also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at
1349. Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches, however, do
not provide reasonable suspicion.

United States v. Fernandez, 18

F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994).
In

the

instant

case,

Officer

Allred

testified

that

he

initially approached Merlen because of his suspicions about drug
and alcohol abuse, and his concerns about suicide or depression.
However,

the

officer

testified

that

just

seconds

after

he

approached Merlen, he confirmed that Merlen was not suicidal or
depressed, and was not impaired by beer or drugs.

The officer

asked Merlen about the hand movement he had observed, and Merlen
13

explained that he had been zipping up his pants. (R. 51 at 12:1719). In fact, Officer Allred himself testified that when he asked
Merlen to shut off his engine, his initial suspicions had been
dispelled (R. 51 at 23:20-25, 24:1-8), and he did not have any
suspicion of any additional criminal activity. (R. 51 at 22:16-19).
It should be noted that the State bears the initial burden for
establishing the articulable factual basis for the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support an investigative stop, State v.
Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994); thus, since the officer
himself testified that he did not have specific suspicions of
criminal activity when he asked Merlen to shut down the engine, the
State clearly failed to meet its burden.
The possibility that the vehicle registration may have been
expired should not influence the reasonable suspicion calculation
for several reasons.
suspicion

about

First, the officer did not testify that

expired

registration

was

the basis

for

the

continued detention. (R. 51 at 22:16-19). Secondly, the officer did
not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the plates were
expired on the night in question merely because he had seen the
truck with expired plates on a previous occasion.

Clearly, the

mere fact that a vehicle had expired plates at some time in the
past, without more, does not provide an ongoing justification for
stopping the vehicle or detaining its occupants. Thirdly, if the
officer developed reasonable suspicion in that regard (by looking
at

the

temporary

sticker

or
14

questioning

Merlen

about

the

registration), it was after

the officer unlawfully detained Merlen

by asking him to turn the engine of his truck off.

(R. 51 at 23:9-

13, 12:4-11, 13:4-10) .
As mentioned above, an investigative stop "must last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Royer,
460 U.S. 500 (emphasis added).

In United States v. Sandoval, 29

F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit makes it abundantly
clear that a detention which is prolonged even a minute or two
beyond

its legal justification

Amendment.

is a violation of the Fourth

In Sandoval, a police officer directed the defendant to

sit in the police car with the officer.

After completing the

traffic citation which was the original justification for the stop,
the officer detained the defendant a minute longer to ask questions
about weapons and drugs. Id. at 541-542. After determining that the
detention had not been rendered a consensual encounter by the
return of the defendant's documents, the court held that the
officer exceeded the authorized scope of the stop, and rendered the
detention unlawful and the consent to search involuntary — even
though the stop was prolonged by a just a minute or two before the
consent was obtained.

Id. at 541-542.

In the instant case, the officer continued to detain Merlen
for several minutes after any lawful justification for the stop had
dissipated. The officer testified that he did not suspect any
particular activity, but simply wanted to talk to Merlen some more.
It was during these minutes, when Merlen was unlawfully detained,
15

that

the officer

asked Merlen

for his driver's

license and

determined to run a warrants check on Merlen.
III. Merlen7s Arrest and Subsequent Search Were the Fruit of
His Illegal Detention.
All of the evidence discovered subsequent to Merlen's arrest
was the fruit of his unlawful detention and thus should have been
suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be
used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal
search.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This includes "the

'fruit" of such illegal conduct.
(1963) .

Wong Sun v. U.S. , 371 U.S. 471

Although Merlen volunteered the information about his

outstanding arrest warrant, he did so after he was unlawfully
detained and after the officer was in the process of running a
warrants check.

Thus, the evidence obtained after his arrest was

clearly the "fruit" of his unlawful arrest, and should have been
suppressed,
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Merlen respectfully asserts that the
trial court erred when it denied his Motion to Suppress, and
requests that his convicted be vacated on that basis.
DATED this

\Z>

day of July, 2/

^LLRED
Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that on the \p

day of July, 2001, I deposited two
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ADDENDUM
A

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
UT ST § 58-37-8
58-37-8 Prohibited acts -Penalties.

(1) Prohibited acts A —Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute;
or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37,
37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance
analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty
of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was
used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during
the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less
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than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a
second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third
or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C -Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a
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manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or
other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception,
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name,
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D —Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under
this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b,
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties
and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds
of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that
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would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a
first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended,
and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted
under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty
prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as
described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the
same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by
an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures,
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of
professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without
the invalid provision or application.

History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, § 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5;
1985, ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch.
95, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989,
ch. 201, § 1; 1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1;
1991, ch. 198, § 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1; 1996, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 64, §
6; 1998, ch. 139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1.
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